What lesson in diplomacy should Persian Gulf Cooperation Council learn from Oman?
TEHRAN - Western imperialism has once again ignited the flames of war in the West Asia region, yet Oman—just as in all previous conflicts over the past 50 years—has remained untouched by the fires of war.
A full examination of Oman’s foreign policy history, particularly its principle of mediation and its doctrine of avoiding regional conflicts, is beyond the scope of this discussion. However, it must be noted that in the case of Iran’s resistance and its allies against Western excesses and what is described as Israel—the West’s aggressive regional proxy—Oman could have served as a model for other countries in the region. Unfortunately, the reactionary and dependent leaders of these states neither wished nor were able to adopt a rational, interest-based policy.
Oman’s pragmatic and realistic approach in dealing with Iran’s resistance and its allies against the West, as well as against American ambitions and interventions, dates back to the eight-year Iran-Iraq War. During that time, Oman not only refrained from supporting Saddam militarily, but in some instances actively engaged in diplomacy in favor of Iran. This doctrine in foreign policy continued through various regional crises—from the Persian Gulf War to the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, and later during the events that followed the wave of Islamic Awakening in the 2010s.
After October 7, Oman accurately assessed the highly tense atmosphere in the region and aligned its policies with regional realities and the broader interests of Muslim countries. With a long-term perspective, Omani leadership understood well that, due to the expansionist tendencies of the Israeli regime and the backing it receives from the United States and the West—especially after the Al-Aqsa Flood operation—the region was bound to face major and turbulent developments, as we are witnessing today.
Following October 7, Oman openly adopted policies that effectively positioned it in opposition to Israel, to the extent that Israeli media outlets even threatened Oman with destabilization. Oman not only expressed support for Palestinian resistance, but also, in several cases—such as the U.S. and its coalition’s attacks on Yemen—refused to allow the use of its land, waters, or airspace for operations against Yemeni resistance forces. In some instances, it acted against Emirati-Israeli interests in Yemen. Moreover, by providing a discreet environment for negotiations, Oman facilitated progress toward resolving the Yemen conflict and contributed to reducing U.S. involvement. Detailing other Omani actions against Israeli interests lies beyond the scope of this text.
A comprehensive review of such policies throughout the past and recent history of Oman’s foreign relations would require considerable time. It is therefore more appropriate here to turn to the rational, interest-driven policies adopted by the Omani government over the past year in managing the Iran–West dossier.
Oman’s policy over the past year can no longer be regarded as a matter of history; rather, it is a current and contemporary issue. It is a policy that Omani leaders have, on several occasions over the past year, openly urged regional countries—especially member states of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council—to adopt. At the Manama summit, Badr Al-Busaidi explicitly criticized the PGCC’s confrontational policies toward Iran, stating that the real enemies of peace and stability in the region are Israel and external interference by major powers. He called on them to adopt a new approach toward Iran and, with an implicit reference to the bombing of the U.S. Al Udeid base in Qatar during the 12-day war, warned them that this is Iran’s policy and cautioned them about the current situation—while implicitly recognizing Iran’s position as justified.
Al-Busaidi’s statements after the outbreak of the Ramadan war were also a clear continuation of his remarks in Manama and reflective of Oman’s broader foreign policy. In an interview with The Economist, he stated: “At a time when the declared aim of the war is the ‘destruction of the Islamic Republic,’ retaliatory attacks on American targets in neighboring countries are not only entirely predictable, but represent the only logical and inevitable option available to Iran’s leadership in the face of such a full-scale war.”
Over the past year, the Omani government has served as a credible witness to the Islamic Republic of Iran’s restraint and flexibility in negotiations. Al-Busaidi repeatedly pointed—both before and after the outbreak of the two wars in 2025–2026—to Iran’s commitment to diplomacy and its efforts to avoid war. In addition to his interview with CNN following his visit to the United States and meeting with J.D. Vance, he told The Economist: “Just hours after the most serious round of negotiations on February 28, Israel and the United States targeted a potential peace with an unlawful military strike. The U.S. government made the wrong decision.”
The Omani government, which has earned the trust of the Islamic Republic over several decades, has once again managed—through its rational and sincere policy—to keep itself away from the flames of war. This approach should not be interpreted as duplicity. Oman did not permit the United States or Western countries to use its land, waters, or airspace, and American and British bases in the country were effectively inactive—indeed, the U.S. base in Oman had been only semi-operational over the past decade. While other countries in the region, behind the scenes, encouraged the United States to carry out attacks and took no steps to restrict the use of their territory or U.S. bases, Oman—both publicly and privately—pursued a path of avoiding war and articulating realities.
Immediately after the outbreak of the war, Oman condemned U.S. attacks. Despite ambiguous and questionable incidents, it did not weaken its political relations and even congratulated the selection of the new leader of the Islamic Revolution. It also maintained constructive cooperation with Iranian residents in Oman and continues to serve as a trusted channel for diplomacy.
Today, thanks to its rational and principled policies, Oman has remained distant from the fires of war. While nearly all regional markets, macroeconomic indicators, and performance metrics have declined sharply, Oman has fared differently. For instance, although its aviation sector had been loss-making, it reportedly returned to profitability within a month. While real estate values in Dubai have fallen by 35%, Oman’s corresponding sector has grown by 13.9%. While many regional ports are effectively paralyzed, Oman’s Duqm Port in the east of the country has seen growth of 152%, with other ports also performing well. Oman has also been able to sell its oil and gas smoothly and at favorable prices during this period. Most importantly, Oman stands to benefit from Iran’s political and economic plans regarding the Strait of Hormuz.
In a recent resolution of Iran’s parliament, Oman was even referred to as a partner in shaping a new legal framework for the strait. The Sultanate’s silence on this sensitive matter can be interpreted as a sign of its approval, further supported by remarks made by some Omani officials in private discussions with Iranian experts and decision-makers.
As you have seen, Oman—having publicly encouraged regional countries to reconsider their policies toward Iran and to recognize what it described as a “Zionist provocation”—likely conveyed even stronger warnings in private meetings. Unfortunately, regional countries, particularly members of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council, continued along what can be described as a misguided path shaped by Western narratives that portray Iran as the enemy. They mistakenly assumed that Iran had been weakened, but recent developments have shown otherwise.
Oman, however, understood this reality and acted accordingly, keeping itself away from the flames of war. Even limited and ambiguous incidents did not divert it from this course. Regrettably, other regional countries chose not to follow Oman’s example and now find themselves in their current situation—which, from this perspective, is seen as a legitimate response by the Islamic Republic of Iran in defense of its territory.
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